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Abstract
This article uses a large matched employer–employee dataset to assess the outcomes of workplace 
partnership for British firms and workers, and the HR practices associated with ‘mutual gains’. 
The findings suggest that HR practices which promote employee voice and participation can 
deliver mutual gains for both employees and employers, but that it is the combination of direct 
and indirect participation which appears to be most useful in generating superior outcomes 
for all stakeholders. However, some practices such as high levels of job flexibility and team 
briefing procedures are found to be negatively associated with work-related attitudes and/or 
organizational performance.
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Introduction
Issues of labour–management cooperation are a recurrent theme in industrial relations 
research, and the most recent wave of interest in many English-speaking nations has 
been the issue of labour–management partnership at the enterprise level (Johnstone and 
Wilkinson, 2016, 2017). Though notoriously difficult to define, a central idea has been 
the promotion of cooperative relations between unions and management (Bacon and 
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Samuel, 2009; Bacon and Storey, 2000; Brown, 2000). However, a broader definition 
views workplace partnership as a particular bundle of supporting HRM policies, prac-
tices and processes, and suggests the possibility of partnership-style arrangements in 
both unionized and non-unionized environments (Johnstone et al., 2009; Johnstone, 
2014; van Wanrooy et al., 2013). This more inclusive definition has clear parallels with 
related concepts such as high performance work systems (e.g. Appelbaum et al., 2000; 
Kochan and Osterman, 1994). A key controversy, however, is the extent to which work-
place partnership can deliver mutual gains (Kochan and Osterman, 1994), and various 
studies have empirically assessed the risks and benefits for unions, employees and 
employers (Butler et al., 2011; Dobbins and Gunnigle, 2009; Geary and Trif, 2011; Guest 
and Peccei, 2001; Johnstone, 2010; Johnstone et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Whyman and 
Petrescu, 2014).
Three main views are apparent in the literature. First, the so-called ‘mutual gains’ 
thesis (Cooke, 1990; Kochan and Osterman, 1994) suggests that all workplace stake-
holders (i.e. organizations, employees and trade unions) can potentially benefit and share 
the growing ‘pie’. Second, the ‘pessimistic thesis’ suggests that the outcomes for unions, 
workers and their representatives are likely to be negative (Kelly, 2004; Upchurch et al., 
2008). Somewhere in between is the ‘constrained mutuality’ thesis (Guest and Peccei, 
2001), which proposes that while employees may derive some gains, the balance of 
advantage is likely to be skewed towards the employer. A similar point is made by Geary 
and Trif (2011), who suggest that the three perspectives are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and that elements of each perspective can be observed in empirical studies of 
partnership. The inconclusive findings of various qualitative case studies also stress the 
need for a more contingent view (e.g. Geary and Trif, 2011; Glover et al., 2014; Kochan 
et al., 2008; Upchurch et al., 2008).
Yet while partnership case studies can provide rich insights into the contextual factors 
associated with ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ examples of labour–management coopera-
tion (e.g. Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2017), it is difficult to generalize about the diffusion 
or effectiveness of partnership at delivering ‘mutual gains’. Such questions lead them-
selves towards quantitative analysis, though to date there have been relatively few such 
studies (e.g. Valizade et al., 2016; Whyman and Petrescu, 2014). Many workplace case 
studies also rely most heavily upon accounts from union representatives and/or manage-
ment respondents, while worker perspectives have been relatively underemphasized 
(Valizade et al., 2016; Glover et al., 2014; Johnstone et al., 2009). This is surprising 
given that mutuality ostensibly lies at the heart of partnership-style employment relation-
ships (Boxall, 2013; Guest et al., 2008) and employees’ experiences are reliable meas-
ures for determining effectiveness of workplace partnership activities (Valizade et al., 
2016). It is thus important to further explore the linkages between partnership practices 
and worker outcomes, and in particular the unresolved issue of whether organizations 
and employees both stand to gain from partnership-style arrangements.
In order to explore the outcomes of workplace partnership for employers and employ-
ees, we use a large matched employer–employee dataset (the Workplace Employment 
Relations Study, WERS2011). Our analysis focuses on large private sector firms (250 or 
more employees), and explores partnership practices and the relationship with selected 
worker outcomes and firm performance. We contribute to the existing literature in 
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several ways. First, situated within social exchange theory, our analysis investigates the 
mutuality of partnership outcomes and includes an assessment of both employee and 
firm outcomes. Second, the survey-based quantitative research method enables us to 
make some broader generalizations about the outcomes of partnership by assessing the 
effectiveness of various forms of workplace partnership mechanisms (i.e. direct vs indi-
rect employee participation) associated with the delivery of mutual gains. Third, instead 
of categorizing partnership outcomes as fitting neatly into one of the three main theoreti-
cal perspectives outlined above, we suggest that the gains from partnership may align 
with more than one of these theoretical frameworks. Much depends upon the utilization 
of specific forms of partnership practices in workplaces. Specifically, rather than simply 
focusing upon the contested but unresolved question of ‘who wins or loses from work-
place partnership’, our empirical analysis also allows us to explore the types of partner-
ship practices.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section provides a 
brief overview of the partnership debate, followed by a definition of partnership, as 
well as the main theoretical perspectives evident in the literature. We then derive the 
hypotheses to be tested. We continue by outlining the dataset used, and explaining 
how we constructed our measures. This is followed by the empirical analysis and 
results of our study. We then provide implications for theory and practice, and pro-
pose directions for future research.
Background
The partnership debate
Partnership has been one of the most high-profile debates in industrial relations in recent 
years (Bacon and Storey, 2000; Brown, 2000; Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2016). In 
Britain, interest in partnership surged in the 1990s, and the concept was embraced by the 
Blair government as a way of ‘modernizing’ employment relations as part of the Fairness 
at Work agenda (Johnstone, 2016). Enthusiasm for partnership was also evident from a 
range of policy bodies including ACAS, the Involvement and Participation Association 
and the TUC (ACAS, 1999; IPA, 1998; TUC, 1998). Though a commonly accepted defi-
nition remained elusive, for most trade unions and industrial relations commentators 
partnership was primarily concerned with improving relations between trade unions and 
employers. However for others, and especially those representing business interests, 
partnership was interpreted much more broadly as a particularly cooperative style of 
employment relations which is possible both with and without unions (see, for example, 
Emmott, 2005).
Many public and private sector employers engaged with the partnership agenda, espe-
cially in unionized organizations where partnership was often viewed as a way of recast-
ing existing union–management relations (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004). By 2003 the 
IPA listed 50 organizations which met their definition of partnership in both union and 
non-union contexts (IPA, 2005), while an academic review of formal union–manage-
ment agreements by Bacon and Samuel (2009) suggested at least 248 such agreements 
had been signed.
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Definitions of partnership
A key challenge has been the lack of a commonly agreed definition (Guest and Peccei, 
2001; Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2004). Some employer bodies were only willing to 
commit to a fairly loose unitarist interpretation, which promotes labour–management 
cooperation but assumes common interests and is wary of trade unions. Most partnership 
researchers, however, subscribed to a pluralist interpretation and viewed effective 
employee representation, usually involving trade unions, as a cornerstone of meaningful 
labour–management partnerships (Bacon and Samuel, 2009). Acknowledging the exist-
ence of non-union employee representation, others noted the possibility of developing 
partnership-style relations in non-union settings, and suggested that the nature of such 
arrangements should also be investigated empirically (Ackers et al., 2005; Johnstone 
et al., 2010a; Shah et al., 2016). Yet there remains a lack of agreement regarding how we 
identify instances of partnership or non-partnership. Is an organization a prima facie 
‘partnership organization’ because they espouse partnership working with employees 
and their representatives? Does partnership require a formal partnership agreement or are 
de facto partnership relationships feasible? To what extent is partnership defined in terms 
of specific HR practices (such as employee voice) or simply shorthand for certain ER 
processes and outcomes (such as high levels of workplace cooperation)?
Based upon a review of a decade of British partnership research, Johnstone et al. 
(2009) suggested that a more useful definition of partnership would identify both the HR 
practices and employment relations processes associated with partnership. In terms of 
practices, employee voice is central to all definitions, and this may involve a mix of 
direct participation, representative participation and financial involvement. In addition to 
(representative) employee voice, complementary HR practices include mechanisms to 
support communication, flexibility and job security. Many of these HR practices are 
similar to those normally identified as part of a ‘high performance work system’ or ‘high 
commitment’ approach to HRM (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Roche, 2009).
In terms of employment relations processes, decision-making and the nature of actor 
relationships are also believed to be important. Decision-making processes are expected 
to be highly participative with extensive dialogue and consultation between manage-
ment, employees and their representatives at an early stage. Actor relationships thus 
require high levels of trust, openness and transparency, as well as commitments to joint 
problem-solving and business success (Bacon and Storey, 2000; Johnstone, 2014; 
Johnstone et al., 2009).
In the present study, we operationalize workplace partnership to include indirect 
employee participation through trade union representation as well as direct employee 
participation mechanisms. In particular, our conceptualization of partnership practices 
using the WERS dataset is heavily influenced by the work of Guest and Peccei (2001) 
and Guest et al. (2008). Borrowing from the operational checklist of eight implicit and 
explicit partnership-type activities, Guest et al. (2008) provide five conceptual categories 
of partnership practices detected in WERS 2004, including (1) direct employee partici-
pation, including task-based decisions and direct contribution through quality improve-
ment teams and attitude surveys; (2) representative participation in a range of issues (e.g. 
pay, holidays); (3) performance management, including performance appraisal and 
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incentive payment systems; (4) employee share ownership programmes; and (5) down-
ward communication, including information-sharing, harmonization and employment 
security. In total, 18 partnership practices1 were identified. Though the set of practices 
may look like a combination of employee participation and high commitment work prac-
tices, they may represent the process of mutuality (Guest et al., 2008). Given that the 
partnership label has always been vague and controversial there are of course questions 
regarding the extent to which the term remains analytically relevant or useful (Oxenbridge 
and Brown, 2004). However the term remains influential and widely used in discussions 
of labour–management cooperation in both policy and academic circles. Furthermore, 
WERS11 includes a discussion of ‘partnership’ for the first time in the series (van 
Wanrooy et al., 2013).
Workplace partnership and social exchange theory
In conceptualizing partnership, social exchange theory is one of the most influential 
conceptual paradigms that has been adopted in understanding the employment relation-
ship (Coyle-Shapiro and Conway, 2005). The best known exchange rule is probably reci-
procity, where party one, upon receiving a favour or reward from party two, receives an 
obligation to reciprocate and vice versa. Molm (2000, 2003) argues that a ‘reciprocal 
exchange’ does not include explicit bargaining, rather it relies on interdependence 
between exchanging parties (one party’s actions are contingent on the other’s behaviour) 
that reduces risk and encourages cooperation (Molm, 1994). On the other hand, parties 
of exchange may also negotiate rules in the hope of reaching a beneficial arrangement 
(Cook and Emerson, 1978; Cook et al., 1983). Such agreements tend to be more explicit 
than those built upon the norm of reciprocity, and the duties and obligations exchanged 
are detailed and understood (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). Negotiated exchanges are 
essentially economic transactions where individuals consider how to minimize costs and 
maximize rewards through a subjective cost/benefit analysis (Kinge, 2014). The general 
rule is that relationships will be established and maintained if the balance between costs 
and rewards can be achieved. Such balancing is referred to as reciprocity (Gouldner, 
1960), and is formed and strengthened by creating obligations and feelings of indebted-
ness from one party towards another in exchange for their past positive (or beneficial) 
behaviour. As each party regularly reciprocates and discharges their obligations they 
prove themselves trustworthy. This in turn strengthens the exchange relationship.
Kinge (2014) argues that the social exchange theory provides a useful theoretical lens 
to capture the conditions that foster reciprocity, and explain how relations between actors 
contribute to a sustainable partnership or result in its collapse. Partnership relationships 
are conceptualized as social interactions, and a process of negotiated exchanges of both 
material and non-material goods between employees and their employers through either 
direct (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002) or indirect (Upchurch et al., 2006) arrangements. 
Belanger and Edwards (2007) view partnership practices as a set of collaborative initia-
tives that aim to foster reconciliation of both employer and employee interests using 
mechanisms of social dialogues and consultative systems. Partnership mechanisms can 
thus be interpreted as a communication system and viewed as having a symbolic or sig-
nalling function to employees. The development and implementation of a wide range of 
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partnership practices is valuable in strengthening the message and making it salient. 
Employees interpret partnership-type activities as indicative of organizational support 
and duty of care, and accordingly they reciprocate with positive employee attitudinal and 
behavioural outcomes, including organizational commitment and job satisfaction 
(Valizade et al., 2016; Whitener, 2001). The benefits and costs of partnership arrange-
ments can be considered as having an extrinsic or pecuniary nature versus an intrinsic or 
non-pecuniary nature (Cooke, 1990). In assessing the types of worker gains (or losses), 
Glover et al. (2014) suggest that these may encompass both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ gains. Roche 
(2009) proposes that employees are more likely to benefit from partnerships that embrace 
intrinsic characteristics, such as a more pleasant working environment, improved com-
munication, a better quality of work life and better working relations between manage-
ment and employees. In particular, partnership arrangements reflect a more cooperative 
and consultative approach to labour management, emphasizing the benefits of employee 
voice in decision-making processes in terms of employee commitment and positive work 
attitudes and behaviours.
However, the norm of reciprocity also has a negative side. Employees may believe 
management cannot be relied upon (e.g. hostilities, insincerity), and therefore feel more 
exposed and vulnerable, jeopardizing positive attitudes towards the organization (Tzafrir, 
2005). This is consistent with the ‘behavioural perspective’; in other words partnership 
is adopted by employers primarily to control employee behaviour and improve organiza-
tional performance (e.g. Van De Voorde et al., 2012). Partnership can thus be viewed 
primarily as a means of reasserting managerial control over employees (Whyman and 
Petrescu, 2014). While such an approach might deliver benefits for organizations, it is 
unlikely that a highly lop-sided arrangement will benefit workers or their representa-
tives, and where an acceptable balance of costs and rewards is not attained partnership 
might collapse.
The ‘pessimistic thesis’ suggests that workers and trade unions do not stand to gain 
much, if anything, from workplace partnership (Kelly, 2004; Upchurch et al., 2008). 
Adherents to this ‘win–lose’ view argue that employers typically determine which part-
nership practices are implemented, and employees are unlikely to derive any significant 
gains (Godard, 2004). Evidence of this perspective is probably most apparent in the 
partnership critiques by radical and labour process scholars in the British literature. In a 
study of matched partnership and non-partnership firms, Kelly (2004) found that while 
employers appeared to benefit from partnership, there were negligible gains for workers 
or trade unions when evaluated against criteria such as wages, hours worked, holidays or 
job losses. Indeed, in terms of wage levels, employment security and influence over 
decision-making the findings were negative. Employee gains were only found to be 
achieved where unions were strong, and where the firm was performing well. It is sug-
gested that in most cases partnerships are likely to be lop-sided or ‘employer dominant’. 
Similar critiques have been offered by Upchurch et al. (2008) and Danford et al. (2014) 
in studies which doubt the potential benefits for employees or trade unions.
Finally, the ‘constrained mutuality’ thesis also suggests that employees and their repre-
sentatives may well stand to benefit in some ways from partnership, but that typically the 
‘balance of advantage’ will be tipped in favour of the employer (Guest and Peccei, 2001). 
Perhaps this is not necessarily a problem so long as all parties do benefit in some way; 
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indeed it is difficult to imagine what a perfectly balanced arrangement would look like. 
Yet to be sustainable partnership cannot be completely lop-sided, as ‘positive organisa-
tional outcomes of interest to employers depend for their achievement upon the prior 
achievement of outcomes likely to be relevant to employees and their representatives’ 
(Guest and Peccei, 2001: 231). If partnership is perceived to be serving primarily or exclu-
sively the interests of employers the potential for these gains will likely be short lived. 
From this perspective, while establishing a workplace partnership may be possible in 
certain circumstances, it is also likely to be difficult to sustain and vulnerable to collapse, 
especially in lightly regulated liberal market economies (Dobbins and Dundon, 2016).
Mutual gains and hypotheses derivation
Perhaps the most highly contested debate is the extent to which partnership practices 
and processes will lead to mutually beneficial employment relations outcomes for both 
firms and workers. The mutuality view is essentially reflected in the tenets of social 
exchange theory: the generation of valued organizational outcomes is conditional upon 
the influence of employer behaviour on employee beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. 
Employee behaviours are critical to whether desired organizational outcomes will be 
attained, and shaped by employee perceptions of and their cognitive and affective 
responses to various partnership activities (Boxall and Macky, 2007). Our first analysis 
of partnership outcomes at an individual level investigates the relationship between 
workplace partnership practices and the levels of employee job satisfaction and organi-
zational commitment (Glover et al., 2014; Roche, 2009; Valizade et al., 2016). The sec-
ond analysis at an employer level examines the relationship between partnership practices 
and two indicators of organizational performance: labour productivity and financial 
performance.
The mutual gains view or ‘optimistic perspective’ (Cooke, 1990) builds on a rational 
choice approach whereby partnership provides an efficient mechanism to increase the 
total ‘pie’ available to be shared between employers and their employees rather than an 
adversarial model (Geary and Trif, 2011). For gains to be accrued to all parties, the part-
nership principles and practices need to be established simultaneously at multiple levels 
within the organization, i.e. at ‘strategic level’, ‘functional human resource policy level’ 
and workplace level (Kochan and Osterman, 1994). In addition are participative struc-
tures and processes that emphasize the intrinsic motivation/values/rewards through 
which employees make contributions that directly relate to work tasks and work organi-
zations (e.g. direct task-based participation, ‘briefing groups’ or two-way communica-
tion) (White et al., 2004), and channels for employee voice. To this end, participatory 
practices both in tandem and in alignment (Geary and Trif, 2011) highlight employees’ 
awareness of their ‘voice’ or ‘say’ in workplace decisions (Glover et al., 2014; Timming, 
2015) and will foster higher levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment. 
Using a national employee dataset, McGovern et al. (2007) suggest that the main influ-
ence on whether employees see themselves as having a say in changes in relation to their 
jobs are participation in two-way communication or in quality circles. Moreover, ade-
quate representation and assurance of employees’ interests through dialogue with man-
agement enhance employees’ sense of organizational belonging (Wilkinson et al., 2014), 
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which is central to organizational commitment. Similarly, where workplace partnership 
is perceived as a way of improving the quality of working life, we can expect a positive 
association with job satisfaction. Appelbaum et al.’s (2000) study of employment prac-
tices in 44 US manufacturers suggests that participatory work practices, including worker 
autonomy, degree of communication among frontline staff, work in self-directed teams 
and participation in problem-solving teams, can generate a variety of ‘win–win’ out-
comes for both plants and workers, including job satisfaction and organizational com-
mitment. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H1: Job satisfaction is higher in organizations with partnership characteristics than 
those without partnership characteristics.
H2: Organizational commitment is higher in organizations with partnership character-
istics than those without partnership characteristics.
Social exchange theory suggests that the benefits accrued to employees in terms of 
increased job satisfaction and organizational commitment derived from workplace part-
nership will eventually also be reflected in improved firm performance. Evidence has 
shown that employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment are positively 
associated with organizational performance, including labour productivity and financial 
performance (Gould-Williams, 2003; Meyer et al., 2002). Committed and satisfied 
employees not only identify psychologically with their employers and become strongly 
attached to the organization, but also tend to expend discretionary effort towards achiev-
ing organizational ends (Appelbaum et al., 2000). Moreover, a satisfied and committed 
workforce is less likely to exhibit counterproductive behaviours, engaging in a greater 
amount of positive extra-role behaviours and better quality in-role behaviour. For exam-
ple, Knell’s (1999) study of 15 British firms found that the introduction of partnership 
arrangements led to increased turnover and profits for organizations, and a higher level 
of job satisfaction for employees. Hence, we hypothesize that:
H3: Labour productivity is higher in organizations with partnership characteristics 
than those without partnership characteristics.
H4: Financial performance is higher in organizations with partnership characteristics 
than those without partnership characteristics.
Data and measures
Data description
We use the sixth and latest wave of WERS (WERS2011), which is based on a stratified 
sample of UK establishments with five or more employees operating in Sections C to S 
of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 2007) in 2011, accounting for 35% of all 
workplaces and 90% of all employees in the UK. The survey provides useful insights 
into employment relations by collecting a wide range of employment-related informa-
tion from managers, employees and their representatives. In particular, it is the first time 
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that a discussion of workplace ‘partnership’ appears in the WERS series (van Wanrooy 
et al., 2013). The elements of the survey used in the present study consist of face-to-face 
interviews with senior managers with responsibility for employment relations (see 
Management Questionnaire; response rate = 46%), and self-completion questionnaires 
distributed to a random sample of up to 25 employees in each surveyed establishment 
(see Employee Questionnaire; response rate = 54%). Given the distinctiveness of 
employment relations in private and public sector organizations, as well as the differ-
ences between HR practices in large and small firms, we focus only upon large private 
organizations. This is also where much of the debate regarding the efficacy of union and 
non-union partnership has been located. We follow the standard European definition of 
large organizations: only firms that employ 250 or more employees in the private sector 
are included. The WERS dataset includes information on the size of the workplace, but 
also identifies whether the workplace is a single-site or multi-site enterprise and provides 
information in relation to the total number of employees in the multi-site organizations, 
and allows us to identify large organizations with 250 or more employees.
Partnership practices
Given that no consensus has emerged on what partnership activities should be included 
in a comprehensive partnership checklist, the operationalization of partnership practices 
should be readily and independently observable (Dietz, 2004). Following Guest et al.’s 
(2008) five broad conceptual categorizations of workplace partnership based on the 
WERS2004 dataset, we identified 15 individual partnership practices in WERS2011 
consisting of a mix of forms of direct and indirect employee participation in workplaces 
(see Table 1). Specifically, three consultation-based practices (i.e. the presence of a joint 
consultative committee or works council, consultation through union and worker repre-
sentatives) represent indirect or union-based partnership practices. The remaining 12 
partnership practices, including employee participation, communication and informa-
tion-sharing, performance appraisal, contingent pay and employment security, entail the 
process of mutuality (Guest et al., 2008) and are viewed as direct forms of partnership 
working. Drawing on social exchange theory, we have hypothesized that partnership 
practices that offer an opportunity to engage and motivate employees, and to improve 
performance foster positive work-related attitudes and boost organizational performance, 
supporting the mutual gains perspective.
Worker outcomes
We capture the benefits accruable to employees by exploring two of the most widely stud-
ied forms of employee attitudes: job satisfaction and organizational commitment. In 
WERS2011, employee respondents are asked to what extent they are satisfied with nine 
aspects of the job (see Kersley et al., 2006 for WERS2004). The nine items are ‘satisfac-
tion with sense of achievement’, ‘satisfaction with scope of using own initiative’, ‘satis-
faction with influence over the job’, ‘satisfaction with training’, ‘satisfaction with 
opportunity to develop skills’, ‘satisfaction with amount of pay’, ‘satisfaction with job 
security’, ‘satisfaction with involvement in decision-making’ and ‘satisfaction with the 
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Table 1. Averages/proportions of partnership practices (weighteda).
Partnership practices % Direct (non-union based) 
vs indirect (union-based) 
employee participation in 
workplace partnership
Partnership practice 1: Task-based decision
 Non-managerial employees have:b Direct participation, part 
of high performance 
work practices (HPWPs)
  Variety in their work* 2.28
  Discretion over how they do their work* 1.75
  Control over the pace at which they work* 1.25
   Involvement over decisions about how work is 
organized*
1.80
   Overall mean score* 1.77
Partnership practice 2: Involvement
  Worker involvement in introducing and implementing 
any changes in past 2 yearsc
Direct participation, part 
of HPWPs
  They decided 4.6
  They negotiated 4.4
  They were consulted 41.8
  They were informed 35.0
   No involvement 14.1
Partnership practice 3: Job flexibility
  The majority (60% or more) of non-managerial 
employees actually do jobs other than their own at least 
once a weekd
16.7 Direct participation, part 
of HPWPs
Partnership practice 4–5: Face-to-face meeting
  Partnership practice 4: Meetings between line 
management and the whole workforcee
93.3 Direct participation, 
part of HPWPs; central 
to the conception of 
partnership
  Partnership practice 5: Meetings between senior 
managers and the workerse
83.3
Partnership practice 6: Content of communication
  Managers give employees information about all three 
aspects of the firm (i.e. internal investment plans, 
financial information and staffing plans)e
35.1 Direct participation, 
part of HPWPs; central 
to the conception of 
partnership
Partnership practice 7–9: Consultatione
  Partnership practice 7: Joint consultative committee/
works council at workplacee
48.7 Indirect participation, 
union or worker 
representatives; central 
to the conception of 
partnership
  Partnership practice 8: Management normally 
negotiates or consults union representatives about 
seven job aspects of employees (e.g. pay, hours, 
holidays)e
12.7
  Partnership practice 9: Management normally negotiates 
or consults non-union representatives about seven job 
aspects of employees (e.g. pay, hours, holidays)e
1.7
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Partnership practices % Direct (non-union based) 
vs indirect (union-based) 
employee participation in 
workplace partnership
Partnership practice 10: Performance appraisal
  Non-managerial employees whose performance is 
formally appraisede
90.9 Direct participation, part 
of HPWPs
   Among those organizations whose employees’ 
performance is formally appraised, the majority (60% 
or more) of non-managerial employees’ performance 
is formally appraisedd
92.5
Partnership practice 11: PBR (payment by results)/merit pay
  Non-managerial employees receive either results or 
merit paye
60.7 Direct participation, part 
of HPWPs
 Results-based payment alonee 42.9
 Merit pay alonee 37.1
 Both results-based and merit payment schemese 19.3
  Among those organizations that offer either employee 
results- or merit-based pay, the majority of non-
managerial employees receive result or merit payd
78.3
Partnership practice 12: Employee share ownership programmes
 Non-managerial workers receive employee share schemese 37.4 Direct participation, part 
of HPWPs   Among those organizations that offer employee share 
ownership schemes, the majority (60% or more) of non-
managerial employees receive employee share schemesd
91.4
Partnership practice 13: Profit-related pay
  Non-managerial workers receive profit-related pay or bonuse 48.9 Direct participation, part 
of HPWPs   Among those organizations that offer employees 
profit-based pay, the majority (60% or more) of non-
managerial workers receive profit-related pay or bonusd
79.8
Partnership practice 14: Single status
  Workplaces that have a standard employment contract 
with non pay terms and conditions for non-managerial 
employeese
92.9 Direct participation, part 
of HPWPs
Partnership practice 15: Job security
  Non-managerial employees are covered by job security 
policye
7.0 Direct participation, part 
of HPWPs
Notes:
aThe weighted averages/proportions are reported, and the unit of analysis is employee (i.e. per observation 
per employee).
bThe practice is measured on a four-point Likert scale: 0 = ‘none’; 1 = ‘a little’; 2 = ‘some’ or 3 = ‘a lot’.
cThe practice is measured on a five-point Likert scale: 0 = ‘no involvement’; 1 = ‘They were informed’; 2 = ‘They 
were consulted’; 3 = ‘They negotiated’ or 4 = ‘They decided’.
dThe practice is measured on a binary scale: 0 = ‘less than 60%’, or 1 = ‘60% or more’.
eThe practice is measured on a binary scale: 0 = ‘no’ or 1 = ‘yes’.
*These variables are treated as continuous. Weighted means are reported.
Table 1. (Continued)
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work itself’. The responses are evaluated on five-point Likert scale: 1 = ‘strongly disa-
gree’, 2 = ‘disagree’, 3 = ‘neither agree nor disagree’, 4 = ‘agree’ or 5 = ‘strongly agree’. 
Regarding the organizational commitment, three statements are drawn from Employee 
Questionnaire (see Forth et al., 2006): (1) ‘I share many of the values of my organization’; 
(2) ‘I feel loyal to my organization’; and (3) ‘I am proud to tell people who I work for’. 
The responses are also evaluated on five-point Likert scale: 1 = ‘strongly disagree’, 2 = 
‘disagree’, 3 = ‘neither agree nor disagree’, 4 = ‘agree’ or 5 = ‘strongly agree’. To pro-
ceed with the construct a composite score of job satisfaction and organizational commit-
ment is created after computing the Cronbach’s α (α = .87 for job satisfaction, and α = .85 
for organizational commitment) for both indicators of employee outcomes, respectively. 
The summary statistics for worker outcomes are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Organizational outcomes
Two indicators of organizational performance are identified in the Management 
Questionnaire, which are financial performance and labour productivity. Specifically, 
managers are asked to provide responses to the following two questions: ‘Compared with 
other establishments in the same industry, how would you assess financial performance?’ 
and ‘Compared with other establishments in the same industry, how would you assess 
labour productivity?’ Responses are measured on a five-point Likert scale, and coded as 
follow: 1 = ‘a lot below average’, 2 = ‘below average’, 3 = ‘about average’, 4 = ‘better 
than average’, or 5 = ‘a lot better than average’. Here we acknowledge that using man-
agers’ subjective perceptions of firm performance is subject to limitations. However, 
such perceptual measures have been widely adopted, especially in the field of HRM and 
organizational performance (Ferguson and Reio, 2010; Den Hartog and Verburg, 2004).2
Controlled variables
Consistent with prior research based on the WERS dataset, we also control a wide range 
of employee and organizational level characteristics (see Table A2 in the Appendix). In 
particular, employee-level characteristics controlled include job tenure, job status, gen-
der, age, whether the worker has academic qualifications, trade union status, supervisory 
responsibility, weekly wage and ethnicity. Organizational-level variables such as indus-
try, union recognition, age, degree of market competition, the current state of market and 
the experience of recent recession are considered in the estimation.
Empirical results
The association between partnership practices and worker outcomes
In order to empirically investigate the relationship between partnership practices and 
worker/organizational outcomes in large private sector UK organizations, we perform 
regression estimations controlling a number of employee and organizational level char-
acteristics. Table 2 (Panel A) presents the OLS coefficient results related to the factors 
associated with job satisfaction and organizational commitment.3 The results show that a 
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number of ‘partnership practices’ are found to be significantly related to both metrics of 
employee attitudes. Specifically, the measures of ‘task-based participation’, ‘direct com-
munication between senior managers and the whole workforce’, ‘information-sharing 
between managers and their employees’, ‘the presence of profit-related pay for non-
managerial employees’ and ‘the existence of standard employment contracts for non-
managerial employees’ are all found to be positively associated with both job satisfaction 
and organizational commitment.
Importantly, however, we find that the effect of ‘employees’ involvement’ depends on 
the nature of engagement. When employees are simply ‘informed’ about decisions this 
lowers job satisfaction and organizational commitment, whereas when decisions are 
‘negotiated’ this strengthens organizational commitment. Interestingly, we also find that 
high levels of ‘job flexibility’ are negatively related to organizational commitment. 
Overall, given our findings, H1 and H2 are partly supported.
The association between partnership practices and firm performance
Table 2 (Panel B) shows the ordered coefficient results for partnership-related activities 
associated with firm performance.4 The first thing to note is that the majority of partner-
ship practices are significantly associated with financial performance but only around 
half are linked to labour productivity. Among these practices, the key partnership prac-
tices more likely to be associated with higher levels of financial performance and labour 
productivity are ‘regular face-to-face communication between senior managers and the 
whole workforce’, ‘information-sharing between managers and their employees’, ‘the 
presence of results-based pay/merit pay scheme, ‘job security policy for non-managerial 
employees’ and ‘employees’ active involvement in the introduction and implementation 
of organizational changes for past two years’ (i.e. they were ‘negotiated’, or they 
‘decide’). Financial performance is more likely to be higher if ‘task-based participation’ 
and ‘non-managerial employee share ownership programmes’ are present in the 
organization.
In contrast, the ‘incidence of direct communication between line managers and the 
whole workforce’ (i.e. team briefing) is negatively related to both indicators of firm 
performance. The result is interesting given the fact that communication with senior 
managers has a positive effect. This might call into question the effectiveness of team 
briefings as a form of employee voice, compared to face-to-face meetings between 
the workforce and senior management, or other mechanisms which allow for employee 
involvement in organizational change. Potential explanations include the moderating 
role of line managers and the possibility that employees view such meetings as a shal-
low or even ineffective form of involvement. After all, the existence of an employee 
involvement mechanism such as team briefing can reveal little about how it is utilized 
in practice (Marchington et al., 1992). Interestingly, while we also find that ‘involve-
ment of union in consultation’ reduces organizational performance, we also find that 
overall union recognition is associated with better organizational performance. One 
possible explanation is that firms engage in union consultations at times of actual or 
anticipated challenges in respect of organizational performance. We also find that, 
‘the presence of managerial–employee consultation committee’ as well as 
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Table 2. Estimation results of the relationship between partnership practices and employee/
employer outcomes.
Partnership practices Panel Aa Panel B
Job satisfaction Organizational 
commitment
Financial 
performance
Labour 
productivity
Estimation models OLS estimates Ordered probit estimates
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Task-based participation 0.044** 0.062*** 0.184*** −0.027
 0.018 0.021 0.030 0.031
Involvement (base cat. = no involvement)
  Employees were 
informed
−0.053* −0.056* −0.010 −0.083*
0.029 0.033 0.048 0.050
  Employees were 
consulted
0.010 0.020 0.16.1*** –0.045
0.028 0.032 0.047 0.049
  Employees negotiated 0.003 0.126** 0.597*** 0.144*
0.051 0.057 0.085 0.084
 Employees decide 0.019 0.007 0.484*** 0.234***
0.052 0.058 0.083 0.084
Job flexibility (base cat. = 
less than 60%)
−0.032 −0.058** 0.032 −0.186***
0.026 0.029 0.041 0.043
Face-to-face meeting 
with line managers (base 
cat. = no)
−0.039 −0.011 −0.190*** −0.126**
0.039 0.043 0.061 0.063
Face-to-face meeting 
with senior managers 
(base cat. = no)
0.073** 0.07** 0.176*** 0.230***
0.026 0.029 0.042 0.042
Content of 
communication (base 
cat. = no)
0.056*** 0.072*** 0.097*** 0.106***
0.019 0.021 0.031 0.032
Consultation committee 
(base cat. = no)
0.009 −0.003 −0.155*** −0.048
0.019 0.022 0.031 0.032
Union consultation (base 
cat. = not all aspects 
were covered)
−0.019 0.032 −0.087* −0.085*
0.027 0.031 0.045 0.046
Non-union consultation 
(base cat. = not all 
aspects were covered)
0.062 0.008 −0.193 −0.223**
0.065 0.073 0.105 0.110
Performance appraisal 
(base cat. = no)
0.044 0.048 −0.062 −0.078
0.032 0.036 0.051 0.051
PBR/merit pay (base cat. 
= no)
0.007 0.024 0.322*** 0.277***
0.020 0.022 0.032 0.033
Employee share 
ownership programmes 
(base cat. = no)
−0.016 0.0004 0.109*** −0.043
0.022 0.025 0.035 0.036
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‘profit-sharing pay’ are more likely to be related to lower levels of financial perfor-
mance. Finally, we reveal that high levels of ‘job flexibility’ reduce labour productiv-
ity. Our results therefore partly support H3 and H4.
Discussion and conclusion
There has been an intense debate regarding ‘who gains what’ from workplace partnership 
(Geary and Trif, 2011; Guest and Peccei, 2001), and three main perspectives are evident 
in the extant literature. While the ‘mutual gains’ proponents contend that both employees 
and employers may derive benefits from workplace partnership (e.g. Kochan and 
Osterman, 1994), the pessimistic perspective claims that employees experience negative 
outcomes (e.g. Danford et al., 2005, 2014), while the constrained mutuality perspective 
argues that though workers stand to benefit, potential gains are generally tipped in favour 
of employers (Guest and Peccei, 2001), and as such voluntary labour–management part-
nerships can be difficult to sustain and vulnerable to collapse (Dobbins and Dundon, 
Partnership practices Panel Aa Panel B
Job satisfaction Organizational 
commitment
Financial 
performance
Labour 
productivity
Estimation models OLS estimates Ordered probit estimates
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Profit-sharing scheme 
(base cat. = none)
0.044** 0.058*** −0.113*** 0.001
0.020 0.023 0.032 0.033
Single status (base cat. 
= no)
0.095** 0.102** 0.089 0.076
0.039 0.044 0.063 0.065
Job security (base cat. 
= no)
−0.031 −0.063 0.201*** 0.305***
0.034 0.038 0.055 0.057
Union recognition (base 
cat. = no)
−0.002 −0.028 0.304*** 0.166***
0.023 0.026 0.037 0.038
Controls yes yes yes yes
Log likelihood - - −6,990.93 −6,185.73
χ2 [degrees of freedom] - - 1,101.55[64] 894.70[64]
Adj. R2 0.08 0.08 - -
Observationsb 6114 6258 578 571
Notes:
aWe also implemented a random effect OLS estimator to control for intra-firm correlation, given that 
multiple employees respondents may be nested in the same organizations. Estimation coefficients results are 
largely unchanged, and results are available upon request.
bObservations reported for Panel A are the numbers of employees, and for Panel B are number of organiza-
tions.
Values reported below the coefficients are standard error.
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01.
Table 2. (Continued)
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2016). It is possible to identify empirical evidence to support all three positions (Johnstone 
et al., 2009; Wilkinson et al., 2014).
Using a matched employee–employer dataset, the primary purpose of our study was 
to examine whether workplace partnership delivers ‘mutual gains’ in large private sector 
organizations in the UK, an area of the economy where there has been intense discussion 
regarding the risks and benefits of partnership approaches (Johnstone, 2015). Given part-
nership is concerned with reciprocity and mutuality in the employment relationship, our 
analysis is situated within social exchange theory. Overall, our findings appear to support 
the arguments of Geary and Trif (2011), that the three perspectives evident in the litera-
ture are not mutually exclusive, and that the gains from partnership can be consistent 
with more than one of above perspectives. Much also clearly depends upon the particular 
partnership practices adopted.
First, we reveal some support for the optimistic and mutuality views, especially in the 
incidence of non-union based workplace partnership arrangements that stress direct par-
ticipatory practices and employee voice, including introducing a mixed means of task-
based participation and improved direct two-way and one-way communication between 
managers and employees. This is an important finding given that despite an extensive 
literature, few studies have empirically explored the potential of non-union partnerships 
to deliver mutual gains, perhaps reflecting a continued suspicion of non-union employee 
representation in industrial relations (Gollan et al., 2014), as well as some definitions 
which limit workplace partnership to union–management agreements (Bacon and 
Samuel, 2009). We also find that partnership practices associated with upward and 
downward communication, namely ‘regular meetings between senior management and 
the workforce’ and ‘information-sharing about internal investment plans, financial 
information and staffing plans between managers and employees’, are associated with 
higher levels of job satisfaction and organizational commitment, as well as better labour 
productivity and financial performance. Again, this reinforces the potential value and 
utility of direct employee participation techniques. Our findings thus correspond with 
Cooke’s (1990) argument that ‘bottom-line gains’ at both macro- and micro-level could 
be achieved if the intrinsic motivation/benefits such as improved communication and 
better relations between senior management and employees were emphasized and exer-
cised through two-way communication.
In addition, two other partnership practices, ‘task-based participation’ (i.e. ‘variety in 
employees’ work’, ‘discretion over how employees do their work’, ‘control over the pace 
at which employees work’ and ‘involvement over decisions about how work is organ-
ized’) and ‘employees’ involvement’ (i.e. ‘workers are negotiated in terms of introducing 
and implementing any changes in past 2 years’), are found to lend some support to the 
‘win–win’ perspective. While employee voice is central to most definitions of workplace 
partnership there has been little agreement among policymakers and employers regard-
ing what form voice should take. In contrast to Kelly’s (2004) findings suggesting that 
employees only gain from workplace partnership in the presence of a strong and power-
ful union voice in organizations (i.e. indirect employee participation), our findings reveal 
the potential utility of direct employee involvement practices including task-based par-
ticipation and effective communication (i.e. meetings between employees and managers 
and information-sharing) in creating mutual gains for both employees and employers. 
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This is significant given the low union density in the British private sector, where the 
current choice for many workers may be between non-union voice mechanisms or no 
voice at all (Johnstone et al., 2010a). However, we also confirm the limitation of dilute 
forms of employee ‘voice’ which offer employees little opportunity to express opinions 
or influence organizational decisions; indeed, given our finding that union recognition is 
associated with superior firm outcomes it seems likely a combination of direct and indi-
rect participation is most useful in generating positive outcomes for all stakeholders 
(Geary and Trif, 2011: 46). Following Guest et al. (2008), the pursuit of partnership 
certainly pays off if it includes workers’ direct participation and autonomy. By implica-
tion, a sustainable workplace partnership that derives gains for all stakeholders may rest 
upon a reciprocal relationship of an intrinsic or non-pecuniary nature.
Second, to some extent our findings are in line with a ‘win–lose’ view. For example, 
high levels of job flexibility, often included as an ingredient of partnership working, are 
found to be negatively related to organizational commitment. This might suggest that 
while high job flexibility can be desirable for employers, employees may prefer greater 
stability at work. It might also reflect that while partnership theory recommends a quid 
pro quo between employee flexibility and job security (Kelly, 2004), this trade-off is not 
being achieved or perceived in practice. Indeed, a ‘job security policy’ designed for 
non-managerial employees means the probability of reporting better financial perfor-
mance and labour productivity, but such practices exert a non-significant effect on 
employee attitudes. One explanation is that job security policies are normally concerned 
with developing policies for managing workforce reductions rather than avoiding 
reductions or making explicit commitments to employment stabilization policies. The 
impact of job security policies on employee perceptions is also complex, especially 
given the heterogeneity among individual workers. On the one hand they might have the 
desired effect of reducing employee perceptions of insecurity, while on the other it is 
possible that employers introduce formal policies where concerns about job security are 
already high. Similarly, partnership practices measuring employees’ financial involve-
ment, i.e. ‘non-managerial employees receive results-based pay/merit pay’ and ‘non-
managerial employees receive share ownership schemes’, are more likely to be 
associated with high levels of financial performance and labour productivity. However, 
they are statistically insignificant in relation to both indicators of employee outcomes. 
This pessimistic perception of work attitudes and firm performance as conflicting out-
comes is probably due to a trade-off between employee attitudinal outcomes and organ-
izational performance (Van De Voorde et al., 2012). That is improvement or enhancement 
in performance at organizational level is achieved at the expense of negative outcomes 
at individual level. The effects of HRM policies and practices are mediated by employ-
ees’ perception and reactions, and subsequently shape their attitudinal and behaviour 
responses (Purcell and Kinnie, 2007). If employees perceive significant ‘asymmetry’ 
regarding the balance of advantage in workplace partnership, negative outcomes may 
emerge in terms of work attitudes (Roche, 2009). This is particularly so in an organiza-
tion achieving higher financial performance. In such circumstances partnership-type 
HR practices may be viewed by employees as a facade or even a controlling mecha-
nism, and thus increase the level of work intensification and job stress (Ramsay et al., 
2000), leading to job dissatisfaction and reduced employee commitment. This provides 
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some support for the arguments advanced by the partnership critics (Danford et al., 
2014; Kelly, 2004; Upchurch et al., 2008).
Lastly, we find that some results do not neatly fit into any of the three main perspec-
tives on partnership. Two partnership practices, namely ‘profit-related pay’ and ‘the 
presence of a standard employment contract with non-pay terms and conditions’ for non-
managerial staff, are associated with high levels of job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment but have no or even a negative association with indicators of (financial) 
firm performance. One potential explanation is the multidimensional nature of the notion 
of organizational performance: employee attitudes are characterized as an outcome in 
parallel with organizational performance (Paauwe, 2004).
Implication and limitations
The present study provides some avenues for future research. Using a representative 
employer and employee survey, we have conducted a preliminary analysis of any potentially 
direct association between various forms of individual direct (non-union based) and indirect 
(union-based) workplace partnership practices and worker/firm performance outcomes. The 
results suggest that workplace partnership practices, especially those that promote robust 
employee voice including non-union based mechanisms and direct participatory partnership 
practices, i.e. task-based participation and improved two-way communication, might enable 
a shift towards a ‘mutual gains enterprise’ potentially benefiting both employees and 
employers. This is important given that most of the extant research focuses on unionized 
workplaces and arrangements in non-union contexts remain relatively unexplored.
Adherents to the ‘constrained mutuality’ perspective suggest that the effects depend 
heavily upon context, including economic climate, union involvement, the initiatives and 
depth of partnership, and union density (Belanger and Edwards, 2007; Roche, 2009). 
Our study, however, focuses upon the analysis of direct associations between workplace 
partnership and employee/organizational level outcomes. However, it is important to 
apply the propositions in different contexts and further test and investigate the associa-
tion/strength of the relationship between employee/employer outcomes and different 
partnership practices. It would also be useful to explore other employee outcomes in 
addition to those identified here, including employee wellbeing and perceptions of job 
quality. Further explorations of the dynamics of ‘non-union partnerships’ offer another 
interesting avenue for future research.
A key implication of the present study is that it highlights the importance of employee 
voice and participation as a cornerstone of workplace partnership (Johnstone, 2015). 
Perhaps the continued value of the language of workplace partnership is, in contrast to 
more fashionable terms such as engagement, its emphasis upon the importance of reciproc-
ity and mutuality in the employment relationship and the acknowledgement of different 
stakeholders with sometimes divergent interests (Boxall, 2013; Purcell, 2013). In terms of 
practices, we highlight the continued significance of high performance work practices, 
particularly those concerned with employee involvement practices and voice. Our study 
confirms that employees can certainly reciprocate with positive work attitudes where 
employers offer a generous amount of autonomy and discretion over their work, a sense of 
stability, shared information and involve employees in organizational decision-making. 
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Our evidence thus supports the arguments of Kochan and Osterman (1994) that to deliver 
mutual gains, partnership is not concerned with a single HR practice or simple solution. 
Rather, it is the combination and mutually reinforcing effect of HR policies and practices 
which is most likely to deliver mutual gains, and probably explains the seemingly contra-
dictory results in the existing literature. Crucially, we confirm that arrangements which 
prioritize effective employee voice (union and non-union) can potentially yield benefits for 
both employers and employees (Johnstone and Ackers, 2015). In practice, however, HR 
strategies are likely to reflect a competitive strategy (Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Sisson 
and Storey, 2000). Partnership approaches stressing reciprocity, mutual gain and worker 
voice are likely to appeal more to employers competing on the basis of quality or innova-
tion, than those prioritizing cost-reduction, where instead we might expect to find limited 
employer interest in worker voice or high commitment HRM strategies. This may also 
partly explain the limited diffusion of voluntary workplace partnerships in Britain, where 
cost-reducers are the most common type of firm (Marchington et al., 2016). This is not to 
say, however, that such firms and their employees do not stand to benefit from the potential 
gains which can accrue from labour–management partnership, or that all such firms use the 
same HR practices. While contingencies such as competitive strategy may help explain 
differences, in reality a combination of various factors shape HR practice.
Finally, limitations of the dataset should be borne in mind. The provenance of a 
matched employer–employee survey limits the range of trade union outcomes that could 
be investigated. However, it allows us to simultaneously analyse the effect of partnership 
on employee and employer outcomes, accounting for individual and organizational char-
acteristics. A lack of consensus regarding the definition and conceptualization of partner-
ship has resulted in problems in empirical literature, and as Guest et al. (2008) note in 
their study based upon an earlier WERS study, HR-based partnership practices may not 
‘look like’ partnership. However, they do reflect the idea of partnership if they are accom-
modated within the concepts of mutuality and employee voice, which are central to all 
definitions of partnership.
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Notes
1. They are (1) task-based participation, (2) involvement in changes, (3) job flexibility, (4) 
quality improvement programmes, (5) face-to-face meeting, (6) attitude surveys, (7) other 
forms of communication, (8) content of communication, (9) consultative committee, (10–11) 
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content of negotiation/consultation with union (non-union) representatives at workplace, (12) 
performance appraisal, (13) payment by results/merit pay, (14) employee share ownership 
programmes, (15) profit-related pay, (16) fringe benefits, (17) single status and (18) job secu-
rity (Guest et al., 2008: 138–139).
2. Hence, our study follows a similar approach although we acknowledge that future research 
should also focus on comparing subjective and objective performance measures. However, 
Forth and McNabb (2008) find a strong correlation between the subjective and objective 
measures of firm performance using the WERS2004 dataset, suggesting that subjective finan-
cial performance is an appropriate alternative to objective measures.
3. We also estimate a probit and ordered probit model, but the results are generally consistent.
4. Given that financial performance and labour productivity are both measured on a five-point 
Likert scale, the ordered probit regression is applied to examine the direct relationship 
between partnership practices and firm performance.
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive summary of worker outcomes (weighted proportion/means).
Worker outcomes Strongly 
disagree %
Disagree % Neither agree 
nor disagree %
Agree % Strongly 
agree %
Job satisfaction  
Satisfaction with sense of 
achievement
2.63 7.12 18.89 52.25 19.10
Satisfaction with scope of 
using own initiatives
2.59 7.16 16.82 51.35 22.08
Satisfaction with influence 
over the job
2.84 10.19 27.11 45.4 14.4
Satisfaction with training 5.74 15.20 24.12 41.36 13.57
Satisfaction with opportunity 
to develop skills
5.92 15.01 27.38 38.3 13.38
Satisfaction with amount of 
pay
10.99 23.87 23.77 34.97 6.4
Satisfaction with job security 5.07 10.88 23.08 48.62 12.34
Satisfaction with the work 
itself
2.34 6.49 18.32 54.97 17.87
Satisfaction with involvement 
in decision-making
5.47 15.68 37.06 34.15 7.64
Overall job satisfactiona 3.51
(0.019)
Organizational commitment  
I share many of the values of 
my organization
1.68 6.86 27.54 49.59 14.33
I feel loyal to my organization 2.55 6.24 17.83 50.08 23.30
I am proud to tell people 
who I work for
3.36 6.12 23.41 41.89 25.23
Organizational commitmenta 3.78
(0.022)
Notes:
Weighted proportions/means are reported, and unit of analysis is the employee.
aContinuous variables. Weighted means and standard errors (in brackets) are reported.
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Table A2. Statistics summary of demographic characteristics (weighted).
Controlled variables  %
Employee characteristics  
Union membership 24.5
Job tenure  
Less than 1 yr 14.1
1 to less than 2 yrs 11.5
2 to less than 5 yrs 24.5
5 to less than 10 yrs 23.1
10 yrs or more 26.8
Permanent 93.3
Female 54.8
Age  
16–21 5.0
22–29 18.9
30–39 23.1
40–49 24.6
50–59 21.2
60–65+ 7.2
Academic qualification 94.1
Supervisor responsibilities 31.9
Wage  
£60–100 per wk 5.8
£101–220 per wk 13.8
£221–310 per wk 14.5
£311–430 per wk 19.6
£431–520 per wk 10.0
£521–650 per wk 11.1
£651–820 per wk 10.0
£821–1050 per wk 6.9
£1050+ per wk 8.2
Ethnicity (British) 82.4
Organization characteristics  
Industry  
Manufacturing 16.1
Utility 1.3
Construction 1.9
Wholesale and retail 21.1
Transportation and storage 7.8
Accommodation and food service 4.7
Information and communication 4.4
Financial and real estate activities 13.2
Professional, scientific and technical 10.0
Admin and support service 4.1
Health and education 12.7
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Controlled variables  %
Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.4
Other service industry 1.2
Recognized trade union or work 
association
54.1
Degree of competition  
High 82.1
Neutral 10.7
Low 7.1
Current state of market  
Turbulent 35.5
Declining 13.1
Mature 16.9
Growing 34.5
Organization is adversely affected by 
the recession
 
No adverse effect 8.9
Just a little 17.5
A moderate amount 35.8
Quite a lot 23.9
A great deal 13.8
Age (ln)a 3.042
Note:
aContinuous variable, weighted mean is reported.
Table A2. (Continued)
